Hilliary & Rice & Abedin & Comey should be going to jail... Felony after felony after felony
- Thread starter WVU82_rivals
- Start date
@ the 1:18:50 mark Comey repeats that there are ZERO Trump / russia connections...
@ the 2:03 & 2:17 mark about Abedin... wow....
what a snake....
every dumbass democrat asks about Trump & Russia...
15% of the FBIs foreign 'cases' are from immigrants...
@ the 2:03 & 2:17 mark about Abedin... wow....
what a snake....
every dumbass democrat asks about Trump & Russia...
15% of the FBIs foreign 'cases' are from immigrants...
Last edited:
Susan Rice won't testify before Senate on Russia hacking, 'unmasking'
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/201...efore-senate-on-russia-hacking-unmasking.html
Susan Rice, Barack Obama's longtime national security adviser, declined Wednesday to testify before a Senate subcommittee about Russian activities during the 2016 election campaign.
Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C. had requested that Rice appear before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism on Monday.
Rice's refusal to testify was first reported by CNN.
In a letter addressed to Graham and ranking member Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, D-R.I., Rice's attorney Kathryn Ruemmler said that her client opted not to appear because Whitehouse had said he did not agree with Graham that Rice should testify.
Ruemmler called Graham's unilateral invitation "a significant departure from the bipartisan invitations extended to other witnesses."
Had she appeared, Rice would have likely faced questions about the so-called "unmasking" of American citizens caught up in conversations with foreign targets of surveillance by the intelligence community. The most prominent figure to be "unmasked" was retired Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, who resigned as Trump's national security adviser in February.
Rice became a central part of the Russia investigation when President Donald Trump said she may have committed a crime when she asked intelligence analysts to disclose the name of a Trump associate mentioned in an intelligence report. Rice has said she did nothing improper.
In a statement of his own, Graham noted Rice's previous denials and said, "I expect we will continue down this path. I hope Ms. Rice will come before the committee – and not just the press."
Judiciary Committee Chairman Sen. Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, said he was "deeply disappointed" at Rice's refusal and added, "Declining to attend because you didn't get an invite from a member of your party is a poor excuse and makes it appear as though she’s hiding something. No investigation will be complete until her role is understood."
Monday's hearing is scheduled to include testimony from former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and former Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates.
Yates' and Clapper's upcoming public testimony is much-anticipated, as they were both scheduled to speak before the House intelligence committee in March. But that hearing was cancelled, some Democrats believe, because the White House wanted to limit what Yates could say. The House intelligence committee has yet to reschedule the public hearing.
Yates is expected to give senators details about her Jan. 26 conversation with the White House counsel about Flynn. She is expected to say that she saw discrepancies between the administration's public statements about Flynn's contacts with the Russian ambassador to the U.S. and what really transpired, a person familiar with that discussion and knowledge of Yates' upcoming testimony told The Associated Press. The person spoke on condition of anonymity ahead the hearing.
Yates is expected to say that she told White House counsel Don McGahn that she was concerned Flynn's communications with the Russian ambassador could leave Flynn in a compromised position as a result of the contradictions between the public depictions of the calls and what intelligence officials knew to be true, the person said. White House officials have said publicly that Yates merely wanted to give them a "heads-up" about Flynn's Russian contacts, but Yates is likely to testify that she approached the White House with alarm, according to the person. The White House has said Flynn was later fired because of misleading the vice president on the content of Flynn's discussions with the ambassador.
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/201...efore-senate-on-russia-hacking-unmasking.html
Susan Rice, Barack Obama's longtime national security adviser, declined Wednesday to testify before a Senate subcommittee about Russian activities during the 2016 election campaign.
Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C. had requested that Rice appear before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism on Monday.
Rice's refusal to testify was first reported by CNN.
In a letter addressed to Graham and ranking member Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, D-R.I., Rice's attorney Kathryn Ruemmler said that her client opted not to appear because Whitehouse had said he did not agree with Graham that Rice should testify.
Ruemmler called Graham's unilateral invitation "a significant departure from the bipartisan invitations extended to other witnesses."
Had she appeared, Rice would have likely faced questions about the so-called "unmasking" of American citizens caught up in conversations with foreign targets of surveillance by the intelligence community. The most prominent figure to be "unmasked" was retired Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, who resigned as Trump's national security adviser in February.
Rice became a central part of the Russia investigation when President Donald Trump said she may have committed a crime when she asked intelligence analysts to disclose the name of a Trump associate mentioned in an intelligence report. Rice has said she did nothing improper.
In a statement of his own, Graham noted Rice's previous denials and said, "I expect we will continue down this path. I hope Ms. Rice will come before the committee – and not just the press."
Judiciary Committee Chairman Sen. Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, said he was "deeply disappointed" at Rice's refusal and added, "Declining to attend because you didn't get an invite from a member of your party is a poor excuse and makes it appear as though she’s hiding something. No investigation will be complete until her role is understood."
Monday's hearing is scheduled to include testimony from former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and former Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates.
Yates' and Clapper's upcoming public testimony is much-anticipated, as they were both scheduled to speak before the House intelligence committee in March. But that hearing was cancelled, some Democrats believe, because the White House wanted to limit what Yates could say. The House intelligence committee has yet to reschedule the public hearing.
Yates is expected to give senators details about her Jan. 26 conversation with the White House counsel about Flynn. She is expected to say that she saw discrepancies between the administration's public statements about Flynn's contacts with the Russian ambassador to the U.S. and what really transpired, a person familiar with that discussion and knowledge of Yates' upcoming testimony told The Associated Press. The person spoke on condition of anonymity ahead the hearing.
Yates is expected to say that she told White House counsel Don McGahn that she was concerned Flynn's communications with the Russian ambassador could leave Flynn in a compromised position as a result of the contradictions between the public depictions of the calls and what intelligence officials knew to be true, the person said. White House officials have said publicly that Yates merely wanted to give them a "heads-up" about Flynn's Russian contacts, but Yates is likely to testify that she approached the White House with alarm, according to the person. The White House has said Flynn was later fired because of misleading the vice president on the content of Flynn's discussions with the ambassador.
What everyone with a Top Secret security clearance knows – or should know
---I had one for 16 years...---
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-deba...cret-security-clearance-knows-or-should-know/
In the world of handling America’s secrets, words – classified, secure, retroactive – have special meanings. I held a Top Secret clearance at the State Department for 24 years and was regularly trained in protecting information as part of that privilege. Here is what some of those words mean in the context of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s emails.
The Inspectors General for the State Department and the intelligence community issued a statement saying Clinton’s personal email system contained classified information. This information, they said, “should never have been transmitted via an unclassified personal system.” The same statement voiced concern that a thumb drive held by Clinton’s lawyer also contains this same secret data. Another report claims the U.S. intelligence community is bracing for the possibility that Clinton’s private email account contains multiple instances of classified information, with some data originating at the CIA and NSA.
A Clinton spokesperson responded that “Any released emails deemed classified by the administration have been done so after the fact, and not at the time they were transmitted.” Clinton claims unequivocally her email contained no classified information, and that no message carried any security marking, such as Confidential or Top Secret.
The key issue in play with Clinton is that it is a violation of national security to maintain classified information on an unclassified system.
Classified, secure, computer systems use a variety of electronic (often generically called TEMPESTed) measures coupled with physical security (special locks, shielded conduits for cabling, armed guards) that differentiate them from an unclassified system. Some of the protections are themselves classified, and unavailable in the private sector. Such standards of protection are highly unlikely to be fulfilled outside a specially designed government facility.
Yet even if retroactive classification was applied only after Clinton hit “send” (and State’s own Inspector General says it wasn’t), she is not off the hook.
What matters in the world of secrets is the information itself, which may or may not be marked “classified.” Employees at the highest levels of access are expected to apply the highest levels of judgment, based on the standards in Executive Order 13526. The government’s basic nondisclosure agreement makes clear the rule is “marked or unmarked classified information.”
In addition, the use of retroactive classification has been tested and approved by the courts, and employees are regularly held accountable for releasing information that was unclassified when they released it, but classified retroactively.
It is a way of doing business inside the government that may at first seem nonsensical, but in practice is essential for keeping secrets.
For example, if an employee were to be handed information sourced from an NSA intercept of a foreign government leader, somehow not marked as classified, she would be expected to recognize the sensitivity of the material itself and treat it as classified. In other cases, an employee might hear something sensitive and be expected to treat the information as classified. The emphasis throughout the classification system is not on strict legalities and coded markings, but on judgment. In essence, employees are required to know right from wrong. It is a duty, however subjective in appearance, one takes on in return for a security clearance.
“Not knowing” would be an unexpected defense from a person with years of government experience.
In addition to information sourced from intelligence, Clinton’s email may contain some back-and-forth discussions among trusted advisors. Such emails are among the most sensitive information inside State, and are otherwise always considered highly classified. Adversaries would very much like to know America’s bargaining strategy. The value of such information is why, for example, the NSA electronically monitored heads of state in Japan and Germany. The Freedom of Information Act recognizes the sensitivity of internal deliberation, and includes a specific exemption for such messages, blocking their release, even years after a decision occurred. If emails discussing policy or decisions were traded on an open network, that would be a serious concern.
The problem for Clinton may be particularly damaging. Every email sent within the State Department’s own systems contains a classification; an employee technically cannot hit “send” without one being applied. Just because Clinton chose to use her own hardware does not relieve her or her staff of this requirement.
Some may say even if Clinton committed security violations, there is no evidence the material got into the wrong hands – no blood, no foul. Legally that is irrelevant. Failing to safeguard information is the issue. It is not necessary to prove the information reached an adversary, or that an adversary did anything harmful with the information for a crime to have occurred. See the cases of Chelsea Manning, Edward Snowden, Jeff Sterling, Thomas Drake, John Kiriakou or even David Petraeus. The standard is “failure to protect” by itself.
None of these laws, rules, regulations or standards fall under the rubric of obscure legalities; they are drilled into persons holding a security clearance via formal training (mandatory yearly for State Department employees), and are common knowledge for the men and women who handle America’s most sensitive information. For those who use government computer systems, electronic tools enforce compliance and security personnel are quick to zero in on violations.
A mantra inside government is that protecting America’s secrets is everyone’s job. That was the standard against which I was measured throughout my career and the standard that should apply to everyone entrusted with classified information.
---I had one for 16 years...---
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-deba...cret-security-clearance-knows-or-should-know/
In the world of handling America’s secrets, words – classified, secure, retroactive – have special meanings. I held a Top Secret clearance at the State Department for 24 years and was regularly trained in protecting information as part of that privilege. Here is what some of those words mean in the context of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s emails.
The Inspectors General for the State Department and the intelligence community issued a statement saying Clinton’s personal email system contained classified information. This information, they said, “should never have been transmitted via an unclassified personal system.” The same statement voiced concern that a thumb drive held by Clinton’s lawyer also contains this same secret data. Another report claims the U.S. intelligence community is bracing for the possibility that Clinton’s private email account contains multiple instances of classified information, with some data originating at the CIA and NSA.
A Clinton spokesperson responded that “Any released emails deemed classified by the administration have been done so after the fact, and not at the time they were transmitted.” Clinton claims unequivocally her email contained no classified information, and that no message carried any security marking, such as Confidential or Top Secret.
The key issue in play with Clinton is that it is a violation of national security to maintain classified information on an unclassified system.
Classified, secure, computer systems use a variety of electronic (often generically called TEMPESTed) measures coupled with physical security (special locks, shielded conduits for cabling, armed guards) that differentiate them from an unclassified system. Some of the protections are themselves classified, and unavailable in the private sector. Such standards of protection are highly unlikely to be fulfilled outside a specially designed government facility.
Yet even if retroactive classification was applied only after Clinton hit “send” (and State’s own Inspector General says it wasn’t), she is not off the hook.
What matters in the world of secrets is the information itself, which may or may not be marked “classified.” Employees at the highest levels of access are expected to apply the highest levels of judgment, based on the standards in Executive Order 13526. The government’s basic nondisclosure agreement makes clear the rule is “marked or unmarked classified information.”
In addition, the use of retroactive classification has been tested and approved by the courts, and employees are regularly held accountable for releasing information that was unclassified when they released it, but classified retroactively.
It is a way of doing business inside the government that may at first seem nonsensical, but in practice is essential for keeping secrets.
For example, if an employee were to be handed information sourced from an NSA intercept of a foreign government leader, somehow not marked as classified, she would be expected to recognize the sensitivity of the material itself and treat it as classified. In other cases, an employee might hear something sensitive and be expected to treat the information as classified. The emphasis throughout the classification system is not on strict legalities and coded markings, but on judgment. In essence, employees are required to know right from wrong. It is a duty, however subjective in appearance, one takes on in return for a security clearance.
“Not knowing” would be an unexpected defense from a person with years of government experience.
In addition to information sourced from intelligence, Clinton’s email may contain some back-and-forth discussions among trusted advisors. Such emails are among the most sensitive information inside State, and are otherwise always considered highly classified. Adversaries would very much like to know America’s bargaining strategy. The value of such information is why, for example, the NSA electronically monitored heads of state in Japan and Germany. The Freedom of Information Act recognizes the sensitivity of internal deliberation, and includes a specific exemption for such messages, blocking their release, even years after a decision occurred. If emails discussing policy or decisions were traded on an open network, that would be a serious concern.
The problem for Clinton may be particularly damaging. Every email sent within the State Department’s own systems contains a classification; an employee technically cannot hit “send” without one being applied. Just because Clinton chose to use her own hardware does not relieve her or her staff of this requirement.
Some may say even if Clinton committed security violations, there is no evidence the material got into the wrong hands – no blood, no foul. Legally that is irrelevant. Failing to safeguard information is the issue. It is not necessary to prove the information reached an adversary, or that an adversary did anything harmful with the information for a crime to have occurred. See the cases of Chelsea Manning, Edward Snowden, Jeff Sterling, Thomas Drake, John Kiriakou or even David Petraeus. The standard is “failure to protect” by itself.
None of these laws, rules, regulations or standards fall under the rubric of obscure legalities; they are drilled into persons holding a security clearance via formal training (mandatory yearly for State Department employees), and are common knowledge for the men and women who handle America’s most sensitive information. For those who use government computer systems, electronic tools enforce compliance and security personnel are quick to zero in on violations.
A mantra inside government is that protecting America’s secrets is everyone’s job. That was the standard against which I was measured throughout my career and the standard that should apply to everyone entrusted with classified information.
