I don't think it was a matter of being scared. When you listen to BGJ speak about his game decisions or his coaching philosophies, he is relying on those things that have been historical truisms with a little bit spice in the form of modern analytics. His end of the game insistence that you need to run the ball has some truth to it. Prior to the 80s, almost all offenses at any level (high school, college, professional) started with the running game. Even if a team got stuffed on 3 straight plays, they would be punting to a team that ran a run-based offense, not to mention that kickers were not nearly as effective as they are today. Comebacks were much harder.
Through the 80s and 90s. passing attacks became more sophisticates with the multiple WR sets. In addition, the skill levels of the players improved thanks to summer camps and 7 on 7 passing leagues.
Ending the game by running the ball and eating up the clock has become difficult. If a team wants to run out the clock, they need first downs any way that they can get them. Against Iowa and Indiana, PSU was one first down away from winning the game. Each time the sequence was 1st down, run and get stuffed, 2nd down run and get stuffed. On 3rd and 8 or 9, a conservative pass that nets 3 or 4 yards with the end result being a punt to the other team or an unsuccessful play on 4th down. The conservative pass on 1st down off of play action has a much better chance of getting reasonable yardage on first down (5, 6, 7 or 8 yards) and keeps the defense on its heels. How many times have we seen the KC Chiefs under Andy Reid and Patrick Mahomes opt to pass at the end of the game when the opponent is geared up to stop the run.
Regarding analytics, it is based on certain historical benchmarks. The use of analytics needs to be considered based on how your team has performed relative to those historical benchmarks. When down by 2 touchdowns, BGJ has multiple times gone for two with the resulting explanation stating that gives your its best chance to win the game. This is based on a historical success rate of somewhere around 44%. During BGFs tenure, how successful was PSU in converting 2-point conversions? My best recollection would be that it is not even close to 44%. The infamous 2019 Illinois game resulted in 7 2-point conversion attempts with PSU being successful on only 2. I really can't recall any meaningful successful 2-point conversion attempts, although there may be some. If your success rate is only 30%, assuming you score the two touchdowns, the outright win rate is 30%. The chance to send it to overtime is 21% (.3*70%). The outright loss chance is 49%. Assuming you win 50% of the time in overtime, using this strategy, the chance of winning is 40.5% and the probability of loss is 59.5%.
In short, winning more game in the clutch requires a revision in the thought process of late game management.
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